In the aftermath of President Clinton's "last-minute" pardons, a variety of "experts" appeared before congressional subcommittees in an attempt to place the resulting "scandal" in a proper historical and legal context. Although no data were presented to support the notion, testimony suggested previous presidents had generally exercised the pardoning power "evenly" across terms, "four or five times" a year, without any "particular" increases in activity near the end of administrations. At the time of the hearings, all of the available empirical research on the topic (published and unpublished) and data reported by the Department of Justice suggested otherwise. The empirical research, however, largely focused on administrations from 1789 to 1932. This paper explores "last-minute" pardons with a new, original data set on the exercise of clemency from 1932 to 2001 initially gathered by researchers at the University of Chicago. The analysis clearly demonstrates members of a congressional subcommittee were wildly misinformed with respect to the use of clemency in previous administrations. The author then explores some possible explanations for the poor quality of congressional testimony, including: governmental policies, partisan transition in the White House and the vested interests of those participating in such hearings.
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I think it is interesting that Chris [Schroeder] has an idea that pardons have come at the end of the term -because in fact, this is the first time that I'm aware of that a huge number of pardons was done at the very end of the term. Usually Presidents pardon very evenly across their term. They pardon evenly across the year.
14 Such statements were surely the basis for a Washington Post article that reported -weeks later -that presidents previous to Clinton had "generally granted pardons steadily throughout their terms." 15 What no one seemed to notice was that the former Pardon Attorney did not single out, or mention any particular administration(s), or present, or cite specific data (or studies) to support the assertions that she made before the television audience and members of the House of Representatives. What also went unnoticed was the fact that, at that time of Ms. Love's testimony, all of the available systematic analysis of trends in federal executive clemency, and data reported annually by her former employer -the Department of Justice -clearly pointed in a very different direction.
Writing and Research at the Time of the Hearings
In 1994, six years before Ms. Love's congressional testimony, a systematic analysis of over three hundred clemency warrants signed by the nation's first four presidents revealed that George Washington granted almost as many pardons on his last day in office as he had in his previous seven years as president combined. The analysis (presented as a professional paper at a major conference in the discipline) found, likewise, that John Adams left the presidency "with a flurry of clemency activity," signing over sixty percent of his warrants in the very last year of his term. Thomas Jefferson, who served two terms, increased clemency activity "significantly" in the last year of his first term and increased such activity, again, in the fourth year of the second term. The two-term administration of James Madison also exhibited "substantial increases" in clemency activity in the fourth and final year of each of the two terms. The study thus documented a clearly established tradition of something like "last-minute" surges in the exercise of clemency in the early Republic (Ruckman 1994) . 16 In 1995, a second professional paper (also presented at a major conference in the discipline) reported the results of data collected -for the first time by anyone -from National Archives Microfilm Set T967, "Pardons and Remissions." The six microfilm rolls contained copies of handwritten clemency warrants issued from the administration of George Washington up to the first administration of Grover Cleveland (1789 Cleveland ( -1893 . When data from T967 were combined with data on individual warrants issued by presidents up to the year 1932, 17 subsequent analysis found that 21 of 36 administrations (or 58 percent) issued the highest number of warrants in the fourth and final year of the term. 18 The study also observed Presidents 5 Coolidge, Grant, Wilson, Hayes and Johnson were notable for signing a larger than usual number of pardons in their last three days in office (Ruckman 1995b ).
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In Table 1 (below), I have somewhat refined the data presented in the 1995 analysis by reporting -again, for the first time anywhere -the actual number of individuals that were affected by clemency warrants in the same time period . 20 By this count, 22 of the 36 administrations feature the largest number of individuals benefiting from clemency decisions in the fourth and final year of the term.
Table 1 -About Here
The administrations summarized from William McKinley forward are of particular interest because they all fall within the time period referred to by Ms. Love's congressional testimony. The nine administrations, from 1897 to 1932, feature two succession presidencies (McKinley and T. Roosevelt -Wilson and Harding). As can be seen, 6 of the 9 feature the highest numbers in the final year of the term. Since this is not the case in either of the succession terms, the highest figures are found in the last year for 6 out of 7 presidencies where the full term was completed. Likewise, the wild variation within the data (from 54 individuals in one year to 677 in another) and distributions within each administration are not such that one would be easily led to conclude that clemency was exercised "evenly" across these terms.
To further assess Ms. Love's suggestion that clemency was granted "four or five times" a year in throughout these terms, I have disaggregated the data by months (see Figures 1-6 ). It is important to remember that the last March of each term (labeled "M" on the far right) is not actually a complete month, but only three days.
Each of the Figures clearly document that, in no sense of the language, can it be reasonably said that clemency was exercised "four or five times" a year, in any of these administrations. Instead, it appears the pardoning power was used year round, with considerable variation from month to month. Furthermore, Figures 5, 6, 8 and 9 display what are -at least arguably -"particular increases" at the end of the terms.
Figures 1 thru 9 -About Here
In 1997, Presidential Studies Quarterly featured an article that examined general trends in the exercise of clemency in the Twentieth Century. It referenced both of the professional papers discussed above 21 and found that, while presidents have increasingly failed to act on clemency applications (by either granting or rejecting requests), when they have taken action, there has been a clear tendency toward 'positive' responses (granting clemency) as terms progress. For example, the average `positive' clemency rate for administrations in the first fiscal year unit of Department of Justice data 22 was 22%. In second and third fiscal year units, averages jumped to 24% and 29% respectively. 23 The average 'positive' clemency rate for the last fiscal year unit of seventeen administrations was 33% (Ruckman 1997) . 24 Finally, in 1999, Presidential Studies Quarterly published a second article on executive clemency, this time focusing on individual grants during the administration of Abraham Lincoln. The article referenced all three of studies above 25 and, once again, revealed similar patterns in the exercise of clemency. The number of warrants Lincoln signed generally increased throughout the term and the fourth year featured the largest number of individuals affected by pardons (Ruckman 1999). 26 Ms. Love told members of Congress that she had "studied" the pardoning power, but the overall conclusions of five empirical studies of historical trends in the exercise of federal executive clemency (two publications and three professional papers) extant at the time of her testimony suggested "last-minute" pardons were, if anything, a great American tradition -a tradition that began with the administration of George Washington and has been, more often than not, adhered to by subsequent presidents.
While none of the studies focused particularly on how "evenly" pardons were granted across terms, no such trend was observed -much less prominent. Whether one is looking at the entire Table, or administrations from William McKinley forward, the presidential terms summarized in Table 1 are no showcase for "evenly" distributed data.
Of course, the perfectly legitimate rejoinder / defense of Love's congressional testimony can be found both in the elasticity of her language and its somewhat odd qualification. Members of the House subcommittee were told that there had been no "particular" increases in pardons at "the end" of administrations "from 1900 to 1980." One person's idea of "particular" (or "huge") may very well differ from another's and, likewise, "the end" of an administration could be defined as the final year, the final week, or the final hour for that matter.
Furthermore, the empirical studies discussed above largely focused on periods of time before 1932. Perhaps in the period 1933 to 1980, Love's assessments were more accurate.
Even then, the former Pardon Attorney's testimony should have raised at least moderate concern among members of Congress. First, she provided no data to support her generalizations. Second, her generalizations contradicted relevant published research and professional papers. Finally -and perhaps most interestingly -her generalizations did not even pan out in data published annually by the Department of Justice. The only thing that might make one hesitant to judge the matter is the fact that Department of Justice data are awkwardly arranged by fiscal year. 27 On their face, however, it appears once again that Love's generalizations were inaccurate.
Empirical Assessment of the Congressional Testimony
In this section, I provide an additional direct empirical assessment of the former Pardon Attorney's suggestion that, between 1900 and 1980, clemency warrants were signed by Presidents "four or five times a year," and that there was "no particular increase in grants" at the end of administrations. To my knowledge, to this day, Ms. Love has not provided any data -in any format -to support her testimony and has, in fact, since repeated its central claims (see footnote 11, above). Nor am I aware of any effort that has been made to assess the accuracy of her generalizations by any other writer or researcher in the discipline of political science, any member of Congress, or any employee in the Office of the Pardon Attorney or the Department of Justice.
At the time of Ms Love's testimony, empirical research on clemency was truly sparse. This was, in large part, due to the fact that the Department of Justice stopped reporting data that would be useful to researchers after 1932 (see discussion below). In the early months of 2001, however, Pardon Attorney Roger C. Adams temporarily released a set of data CDs containing copies of warrants from Microfilm Set T967 and post-1932 warrants that had been kept on file where Ms. Love worked for seven years, in the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
I recently exchanged data gathered from T967 with a research team headed by Richard Posner at the University of Chicago in return for an initial run through the newly released CDs and compared notes with my own preliminary summarization of the CDs. Below, I present the results of this comparison for administrations from Franklin D. Roosevelt to the second term of Bill Clinton . As it is my understanding that a future re-release of the CDs will address problems such as clarity in images, I intend to clean the data in a later version of this paper (see comments below). Table 3 presents original data on the number of individuals who benefited from the clemency decisions in seventeen presidential terms, from 1933 to 2001. 28 The data include pardons, conditional pardons, commutations of sentence, conditional commutations of sentence, respites and remissions of fines, but do not include group pardons or amnesties. Where terms have involved succession presidents (Truman, Johnson and Ford), I have combined the yearly 27 Reporters from the Washington Post may very well have tripped on this complexity when they reported President Clinton "granted no pardons at all during four of his first five years as president (Peter Slevin and George Lardner, Jr. "Rush of Pardons Unusual in Scope, Lack of Scrutiny." Washington Post, March 10, 2001). Compare, however, with Table 3 and Figure 22 , below. 28 It is the author's general impression that, despite the fact that presidents -especially since Eisenhower -have utilized so called "master warrants" (to reduce time spent signing signatures) today, an individual warrant is signed for each clemency recipient. Therefore, there it is no longer important to make distinctions between the number of warrants signed and the actual number of recipients. 8 figures with those of the previous presidents (Roosevelt, Kennedy and Nixon), but separated them in the Table with a forward slash ("/").
Part One: Yearly Data

Table 3 -About Here
My own count of the warrants signed by each president resulted in aggregate figures that are at some variance with official data, reported by the Department of Justice. This may be due to duplicate warrants that I was unable to discover, or warrants that -for whatever reason -did not actually make it onto the CD set.
29 That is to say, at this point in time, I have no reason to question the validity of official data and want to report the differences in my own counting to be as follows:
Given the consistent findings of previous research, it is noteworthy that 7 of the 17 terms in Table 3 feature the highest number of clemency decisions in the fourth year of the term, including three of the last four. The total number of pardons granted by President Clinton places him near the bottom of administrations covered in the Table - with only Bush and Reagan granting fewer -and he set no high marks in the data for any single year of his two terms. Even with the last-minute increase in pardons, there are 10 other years in the Table featuring marks higher than Clinton's fourth year.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the variation in the exercise of clemency across each of the terms is considerable -much like that seen in Table 1 and reported in the studies previously discussed. At first glance, there is little that smacks of "evenness" in the Table. To dramatize the point, I have re-calculated the data in terms of the percentage of an administration's pardons that were granted in each of the four years of the term. The range of the yearly percentages in Table 4 is, again, quite broad (from 0 to 77 percent) and -using 25 percent as a possible baseline of "evenness" across the term -one can see there only two terms in the entire Table where all four years fall between 20 and 30 percent (Franklin Roosevelt's second term and the succession term of Nixon and Ford). There are no terms that feature three such years and less than half (6) feature even two.
One can also see that, in 6 of the 17 terms, thirty percent or more of the pardons were granted in the fourth year. Three additional terms are at the 29 percent mark.
30
Table 4 -About Here
In sum, an initial glance at the data presented in Tables 3 and 4 , and a review of the clemency decisions of presidents from 1900 to 1932 (See discussion of Table 1 , above) would suggest that, in the period 1900 to 1980, presidents rarely, if ever, granted pardons "evenly" 9 across the term and -in 10 of 21 terms -they granted the highest number of pardons in the fourth and final year.
But was clemency granted "four or five times" a year throughout the terms that are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 Table 3 ). The monthly data, in Figures 13 and 21, make it quite clear, however, that there were "particular" increases in clemency decisions in the final months of both terms. As the reader scans the Figures in this section, it is again important to keep in mind that the final months of each term (March -labeled "M," and January -labeled "J,") are not complete months, but only three days and nineteen respectively.
The monthly distribution data are, of course, also a nice direct test of the validity of Ms. Love's statement that pardons were generally granted "four or five times" a year throughout these administrations. Clearly this assessment is wildly inaccurate for the first three terms of Franklin Roosevelt (Figures 10,11, 12) , the succession presidency of Harry Truman (Figure 13 ) and Truman's first complete term (Figure 14) , where it would be more accurate to say clemency was exercised year round, or eleven or twelve times a year.
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On the other hand, the first and second terms of Dwight Eisenhower (Figures 14 and 15) appear to be the first in recent history that are worthy of the "four or five times" a year description. Indeed, Eisenhower granted pardons, on average, in 4.7 months of each year across the two terms. Still, one cannot help but also notice that both of the terms feature what -to that point -was one of the most "particular" (or "huge") last minute pardoning bonanzas in history. The Kennedy and Johnson succession term (Figure 17 ) and the first half of Lyndon Johnson's first complete term (Figure 18 ) indicate a return to the year round approach -where, again, "four or five times" a year simply does not apply. The administrations of Richard Nixon, 31 Using 16 to 20 months where clemency was exercised as a measure of "four to five times" a term, I found only 2 administrations within the range of Love's generalization (Nixon/Ford and Carter). On the other hand, 6 administrations were above 40 months and 2 were above 20. The two remaining administrations featured pardons in 10 and 14 months. 32 I realize Eisenhower set no record for the number of pardons in a term, in a single year, or in the fourth year of the second term. The increase is quite notable, however, relative to the rest of the term. 33 Previous to Eisenhower, higher percentages in the last year of the term can only be found in the administration of John Adams (73 percent) and the first term of James Monroe (58 percent).
Nixon / Ford and Carter (Figures 19-21) all feature more infrequent monthly use of clemency, 34 but, once again, there are clear exaggerations at the end of the terms, especially the last month and a half.
The administrations of Reagan, Bush and Clinton (Figures 22-26 ) are beyond the boundaries of Ms. Love's statement before the congressional subcommittee but, likewise, display infrequent, erratic use of pardons across the terms and last minute blitzes. George Bush granted almost half of all of his pardons in the final month and a half of his term. At the time of this very "particular" increase, the U.S. Pardon Attorney was none other than Margaret Colgate Love.
In sum, for at least 15 of the 21 presidential terms covering the period 1900-1980, it is simply preposterous to say pardons were granted "four or five times" a year. Where such language has been comfortably approximated by presidential behavior, there have also generally been significant increases in clemency grants late in the term.
The Congressional Testimony Revisited
How can an individual with significant experience in the Department of Justice and the Office of the Pardon Attorney, and direct access to all of the critical data that anyone could ever hope for, have such a wildly inaccurate sense of the historical use of clemency? How could testimony before a Congressional subcommittee be so completely unsupported, without any objection, or anyone even noticing? Why was there so little care and concern about historical accuracy in the very wake of Bill Clinton's great pardon scandal? I see the following as among the more significant possible explanations.
Politics (Of Course)
The more historically minded reader may have already observed how recent pardon "scandals" have interestingly emerged when there has been a shift in partisan control of the White House. Table 3 also makes vivid the tendency of incoming (investigating) administrations to respond to such "scandals" with immediate, significant declines in the exercise of clemency -as if to say, "we are truly different from the previous administration." Harry Truman's late-pardon controversy 35 was followed by a significant drop in clemency in the first year of the Eisenhower administration. Scholars routinely credit Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon as a contributing factor to his election defeat and the lowest figure for the Carter administration is found in the first year of the term. George Bush got considerable criticism for his late-term Iran Contra pardons 36 and Bill Clinton followed the controversy with a complete halt in pardoning for a year. Of course, the man who followed the "unprecedented" Clinton pardon scandal is on a record setting pace for pardon parsimony. 37 In sum, partisan 34 Nixon exercised clemency, on average, 2.5 months each year. For the Nixon and Ford term, the average is 4.3 and for Carter it is 4.5. 35 Truman pardoned several individuals against the recommendation of the Pardon Attorney in the final days of his administration including: Representative Andrew J. May, J. Parnell Thomas (former Chair of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee) and Edward F. Pritchard (former advisor to Franklin Roosevelt). 36 Bush pardoned six individuals indicted in cases related to the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. The pardons effectively ended Lawrence Walsh's six-year, thirty five million dollar investigation. 37 In a sense, Lyndon Johnson's scandal came in the middle of the term and he reduced pardons himself as a preemptive strike. A U.S. Senator criticized 70 commutations granted mid-way through the term and the fact that they included a noted Cleveland organized crime figure. Johnson was reported to have been "disgusted" by media motives cannot be ignored when thinking about the incidence of congressional hearings and "investigations," the selection of witnesses and the quality of testimony elicited.
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When Margaret Love told the congressional subcommittee that presidents previous to Mr. Clinton had pardoned "three or four times" a year and "evenly" across the term, it certainly satisfied the sense that she was a valuable "expert" witness. But her unsupported assessment was also acceptable enough to Clinton's congressional critics, because it facilitated the general characterization of his "last-minute" pardons as odd and unusual -which, in politics, are only a step away from indefensible and unacceptable.
There was even a little something in the assessment for Clinton's supporters -as few and unenthusiastic as they may have been at the time. The hearings were held, after all, because of the tremendous media focus and public interest. It is much better for a member of Congress to be part of what is perceived to be an important public dialogue than to be an irrelevant bystander. Love's commentary legitimized the formal care and concern of every member of the subcommittee.
Imagine, on the other hand, if Ms. Love had testified in this manner:
Given his previous record, Mr. Clinton issued a fairly large number of pardons on his last day in office. But, throughout history, most presidents have pardoned the highest number of people in the last year of the term -including Bush, Carter, Reagan, and Ford -and several presidents have increased output significantly in the final days and months of the term -including Coolidge, Grant, Wilson, Hayes, Andrew Johnson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush. However, Mr. Clinton set no records for pardons granted in a single term, or granted in a two-term presidency. He set no records for pardons in the fourth year of a term, or for pardons granted a single year, in any of his eight years as president. Nor did he set the record for pardons granted in a single month or a single day. If anything, he may have set a new record for the highest number of pardons granted on the last day in office. But I cannot speak to that point, because I have never collected or studied data on the topic.
Such a statement would have been more expert sounding -and accurate -but there would have been little satisfaction gained from it for it would have also said, in essence, "why are we even here? There is nothing to see." Likewise, the nation's leading newspapers may not have had as good of an opportunity to feature more headlines about how a "former Pardon Attorney" was so "critical" of Clinton.
A Literature of Neglect
In recent years, writers have generously fed the misconception that very little has been written with respect to the pardoning power. In fact it would be more accurate to say that the literature is voluminous, but contains little that is distinct for fresh, systematic insight into the world of federal executive clemency. Most of what has been written features a legal and/or historical coverage of the commutations and brought clemency to an abrupt halt. Nixon, whose campaign was already stressing the need for "law and order" extended the sharp decline early in his own presidency. 38 While Love's resume was certainly impressive, one might have easily questioned her objectivity as a witness in a congressional hearing of this type. She had clearly been critical of both Clinton's policy and Clinton himself. viewpoint and -apart from a small core of critical pieces (Adler 1989; Buchanan 1978; Duker 1977; Kobil 1991) and an even smaller number of larger works (Humbert 1941; Jensen 1922; Moore 1989 ) -there has, for many years, been a steady yield of anecdote, perspectives of so called "insiders," jurisprudential nuance, and willingness to capitalize on the literature's accumulated weaknesses.
Political scientists have been of little assistance - Adler (1989) and Morris (1998) being notable exceptions. My own review of the literature found a mere four articles in social science journals on the pardoning power. Each article appeared in Presidential Studies Quarterly and only one featured anything like systematic data analysis.
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In sum, when a member of Congress (or anyone else) attempts to gain insight on pardons by a competent literature review, there is precious little material that is original, systematic and informative and much worth skipping over entirely. The observation of a 1939 Report of the Attorney General remains true: the pardoning power is a "neglected orphan," which has grown without "adequate treatment" from scholars and researchers.
The Hurdles
A third explanation for the uncritical acceptance of Love's unsupported assessment had to do with the impractical nature of investigating the clemency practices of the administrations she addressed. Previous to President Clinton's last-minute pardons, and Rodger Adams' release of the data CDs, the hurdles between a researcher outside of the Department of Justice and information about pardons were sizeable. As mentioned above, for information on individual pardons from 1789 to 1893, one had to consult the handwritten warrants copied in Microfilm Set T967. To this day, there is no "descriptive pamphlet" for the six rolls and -to the best of my knowledge -I continue to be the only person to have summarized and analyzed their content.
Individual volumes of the Annual Report of the Attorney General could be used to study the exercise of the pardoning power from 1894 to 1932. Here, researchers could find all of the information once found in handwritten warrants and additional commentary by the president and/or the Attorney General. To my knowledge Humbert (1941) is the only individual -beside myself -to have summarized and analyzed the content of these reports and I am the only researcher who has disaggregated the data -by individual presidents and the year of each term.
In 1933, the Roosevelt administration stopped reporting individual statistics on clemency and, to this day, the Department of Justice reports only aggregate data arranged by fiscal year unit. That is to say, there is no way to determine, from current editions of the Annual Report, who was pardoned, what offenses were pardoned or exactly when pardons were granted.
In sum, at the end of the Clinton administration, the options were quite limited and rigorous, systematic analysis of empirical trends in the exercise of clemency across time came at a very high cost -a cost that few were willing to pay. The unfortunate -but typical -approach of authors, reporters and even public officials was to risk inaccuracies by living with ambiguities of aggregate (but easily obtained) data. Where users kept within the severe limits of the data, there was little light to be shed. Where the limits were misunderstood, brushed over, or simply ignored, the results were disastrous. The average number of pardons per year during [the Reagan] administration was 41. This is the lowest average for any president in U.S. history -not just the lowest percentage of applicants or prison inmates, but also the lowest average number of pardons for any president.
Moore does not identify what specific source(s) she used to reach this dramatic conclusion, but Table 1 (below) demonstrates Reagan could not possibly have had the "lowest average" number of pardons per year "for any president in U.S. history." At least four presidents failed to grant 41 pardons at all, the entire time they were in office (Washington, Adams, W.H. Harrison and Garfield). Thomas Jefferson never pardoned more than 25 individuals in any of the eight years that he was president. Franklin Pierce never topped 40. Washington (first term and second term), Adams, Jefferson (first and second term), Madison (first and second term) Pierce and Buchanan all averaged fewer than 41 pardons per year.
The explanation for Moore's inaccurate assessment is quite simple. The host of presidents with yearly averages lower than Reagan served in office before 1893 and -at the time her book was written -the only way she (or anyone else) could have gotten information about clemency decisions in that time period was to wade through Microfilm Set T967. 40 Likewise, if the former Pardon Attorney, Ms. Love, had simply taken the time to study volumes of the Annual Report of the Attorney General from 1900 to 1932, or thumb through clemency warrants from 1933 to 1980 that were in her Office, and arrange the individual data as I have (in Figures 1-6 and Figures 10-26) , neither she (nor anyone else) would have ever concluded presidents in that period granted pardons "four or five times a year" without "particular" increases near the end of the term.
Disincentives for Congress
Philander Chase Knox, the U.S. Attorney General from 1901 -1904 , discovered a culture of favor and expectation in Washington when he began his service in the second term of William McKinley. A member of Congress once approached him to seek a pardon for a robber who was also a "friend" and "great supporter." When Knox balked at the request, the Congressman blurted angrily, "I understand that each Congressman has a right to two pardons during his term and I want this to be one of mine." While we will perhaps never really know, it just doesn't seem implausible to suspect that the individuals whose names happened to be singled out in news reports did not represent the population of Congressmen who supported applications -formally and informally -and employed the privilege of access to high places on behalf of those seeking pardons. I submit this is well worth remembering when one sees congressional committees calling hearings and "investigating" pardoning. If such processes go far enough, there is a better than average chance they will eventually wind up focusing on other members of Congress. Thus, the clemency problem is a feature of both the executive and legislative branches and there are powerful incentives for Congress to "investigate" lightly, and with great caution.
It follows that no one should ever really expect a serious movement in Congress to restrict the president's pardoning power. Numerous proposals of constitutional amendments have been an effective strategy for grabbing the headlines and appearing to be relevant (or a "key player") in public debate. But such causes have no electoral benefit and, if anything, may create a more restrictive environment for members of Congress.
Ms. Love may have even drawn attention to the need to consider similar disincentives for lawyers who add Department of Justice experience to their resumes and wind up testifying in hearings on pardons. At best, they would shed light on policies and practices. At worst, they might simply defend the bureaucratic framework necessitating their employment or argue for change that enhances their own power within that framework or prestige in the profession. In a December 2002 Washington Post editorial, Love interpreted Bush's stinginess in handing out pardons as "indifference" to the "value and purpose" of clemency. She also called on Bush to "bolster public confidence in the overall morality of the criminal justice system" by using the pardon power "courageously and creatively" and "wisely and generously."
42 Ms. Love is currently in private practice in the Washington area and (understandably enough) advertises executive clemency as an area of personal expertise.
Conclusion
So, then, how are we to think about "last-minute" pardon scandals?
The historical record suggests presidents have usually granted the highest number of pardons in the last year of the term. Whether such increases deserve the "last-minute" tag is entirely a matter of definition. The data presented above indicate increases in the final months of an administration are not uncommon.
The scandalous nature of "last-minute" pardons may very well be the function of erratic or infrequent use of clemency across the term, or substantive matters related to individual decisions. But it is also reasonable to suggest more recent "scandals" are equally the by-product of partisan transition in the White House. The exaggerated decline in clemency that decorates the first year of incoming administrations seems to further validate the point. As such, given all of the attention to Clinton's final pardons, no one should have really expected anything but severe parsimony from George W. Bush, who was already quite well known for stinginess with pardons as the Governor of Texas. 
